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Abstract
Active inference is a first (Bayesian) principles account of how autonomous agents might operate in
dynamic, non-stationary environments. The optimization of congruent formulations of the free energy
functional (variational and expected), in active inference, enables agents to make inferences about the
environment and select optimal behaviors. The agent achieves this by evaluating (sensory) evidence in
relation to its internal generative model that entails beliefs about future (hidden) states and sequence of
actions that it can choose. In contrast to analogous frameworks − by operating in a pure belief-based
setting (free energy functional of beliefs about states) − active inference agents can carry out epistemic
exploration and naturally account for uncertainty about their environment. Through this review, we
disambiguate these properties, by providing a condensed overview of the theory underpinning active
inference. A T-maze simulation is used to demonstrate how these behaviors emerge naturally, as the agent
makes inferences about the observed outcomes and optimizes its generative model (via belief updating).
Additionally, the discrete state-space and time formulation presented provides an accessible guide on how
to derive the (variational and expected) free energy equations and belief updating rules. We conclude by
noting that this formalism can be applied in other engineering applications; e.g., robotic arm movement,
playing Atari games, etc., if appropriate underlying probability distributions (i.e. generative model) can
be formulated.
Keywords: active inference, variational Bayesian inference, free energy principle, generative models
1 Introduction
Active inference provides a framework − derived from first principles − for solving and understanding
the behavior of autonomous agents in situations requiring decision-making under uncertainty (Friston,
FitzGerald et al., 2017; Friston, Rosch et al., 2017). It uses the free energy principle to describe the prop-
erties of random dynamical systems (such as an agent in an environment), and by minimizing the average
of this quantity over time (through gradient descent), optimal behavior can be obtained for a given envi-
ronment (with respect to prior preferences) (Friston, Schwartenbeck et al., 2014; Friston, 2019). More
concretely, optimal behavior is determined by evaluating (sensory) evidence under a generative model of
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(observed) outcomes (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2016). The generative model of the environment con-
tains beliefs about future (hidden) states and sequence of actions (policies) that an agent might choose.
The most likely policies lead to the preferred outcomes. This formulation has two complementary objec-
tives: infer optimal behavior and optimize the generative model based on the agents ability to infer the
observed data. Both can be achieved, simultaneously, by minimizing the free energy functional (function
of a function). Additionally, this free energy formulation gives rise to realistic behaviors, such as natural
exploration-exploitation trade-offs, and by being fully Bayesian, is amenable to on-line learning settings,
where the environment is non-stationary (Friston, Rigoli et al., 2015; Parr & Friston, 2017).
Practically, we need to solve for both the dynamics (optimizing the free energy), but also determine
optimal behavior (i.e., the form of the attracting sets). If the joint probability over the hidden states and
observed outcomes can be associated with a generative model; the log of the generative model evidence
(or the marginal likelihood) becomes surprise; a.k.a. surprisal in physics and information theory (Tribus,
1961). From this, we can use the free energy functional of the generative model under some beliefs
(encoded by internal states) to reproduce the dynamic flows that would give rise to the attracting set that
is specified in terms of the priors of the generative model (i.e., prior preferences or beliefs about states an
agent expects to find itself in).
Congruent formulations of the free energy functional − variational and expected − when coupled
together allow us to account for many aspects of action and perception (both for biological and artificial
agents). Active inference is a formal way to combine the two formulations; namely, self-organization or
self-assembly in physics (Crauel & Flandoli, 1994; Seifert, 2012; Friston, 2019) on one hand and plan-
ning as inference (Attias, 2003; Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Baker & Tenenbaum, 2014) on the other.
This rests on defining random dynamical systems that have attracting sets (with low entropy) that can be
distinguished from their environment, in virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (Friston, 2019). Here we
assume a particular form for the generative model and determine whether the expected free energy can
explain the ensuing behavior by casting non-equilibrium steady-state dynamics as approximate Bayesian
inference (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017; Parr & Friston, 2017; Friston, Rosch et al., 2017). This notion
underpins active inference and allows us to understand how agents navigate non-stationary environments;
making inferences about the environment and how they should act.
The main contributions of active inference − in contrast to analogous frameworks − follow from its
commitments to a pure belief-based scheme. These contributions include: a) a principled account of
epistemic exploration and intrinsic motivation (Parr & Friston, 2017; Schwartenbeck, Passecker et al.,
2019), b) uncertainty is a natural part of belief updating (Parr & Friston, 2017) and c) a reward function
does not have to be explicitly specified. This review paper aims to unpack these properties under the
discrete state-space and time formulation of active inference; thereby providing a brief overview of the
theory.
The review comprises three sections. The first section considers (via definitions) the discrete state-
space (both hidden states and observations) and time formulation of active inference and provides com-
mentary on its implementation. This is followed by a T-maze simulation to provide a concrete example of
the key components of the generative model and update rules in play (previously introduced in (Friston,
Rigoli et al., 2015; Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017)). The simulation offers an explicit account of how an
active inference agent evinces a natural trade-off between exploration and exploitation in non-stationary
environments. We conclude with a brief discussion of how this formalism could be applied in engi-
neering; e.g., robotic arm movement, playing Atari games, etc., and the specification of the underlying
probability distribution or attracting set (through the generative model).
2 Active Inference
Active inference is predicated on understanding how (biological or artificial) agents navigate dynamic,
non-stationary environments (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017; Friston, Rosch et al., 2017). It postulates
that in any given state, an agent maintains a homeostasis by residing in (attractor) states that minimize
entropy (or surprising observations) (Firston, Mattout et al., 2011).
Definition 1 (Surprise). We define entropy as being related to surprise, from information theory:
S = − logP (o) (1)
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the generative process (based on true states, s∗) in the world and the
corresponding (internal) generative model (based on probabilistic beliefs random variables, s, that stand
in for true states that are hidden behind observations) that best explain the outcomes, o, being observed.
This graphic, highlights that the observations are shared between the generative process and model.
o is the set of possible outcomes.
The agent minimizes entropy by creating a generative model of the world. This is necessary because
the agent does not have access to a direct measurement of its current state (i.e. the state of the true
generative process). Instead it can only perceive itself and the world around via its sensory observations
(Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017; Firston, Parr et al., 2017). The generative model − based on incomplete
information about the current (and future) state of the world − can be defined in terms of a partially
observable Markov decision processes (POMDP) (Astrom, 1965). In active inference, the agent makes
choices based on the beliefs about these states of the world and not based on the value of the states
(Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2016). This distinction is key: in standard model-based reinforcement learning
framework the agent is interested in optimizing the value function of the states (Sutton & Barto, 1998);
i.e., making decisions that maximize expected value. In active inference, we are interested in optimizing
a free energy functional of beliefs about states; i.e., making decisions that minimize expected free energy.
A simple abstraction would be to assert that the world has a true (hidden or latent) state s∗, which
results in the observations o (via the generative process) (see Figure 1). The agent correspondingly has
an internal representation of − or expectation about − s , which it infers from o (via its generative
model). The hidden state is a combination of features relevant to the agent (e.g. location, color, etc) and
the observation is the information from the environment (e.g., feedback, etc). By the reverse process of
mapping from its hidden state to the observations (i.e., Bayesian model inversion), the agent can explain
the observations in terms of how they were caused by hidden states.
Definition 2 (Generative Model). The joint model of this simple system is defined as P (o, s). This can be
factorized, assuming conditional independence, into a likelihood function P (o|s) and prior over internal
states P (s) (see Appendix 5.1 for a full specification of the model):
P (o, s) = P (o|s)P (s). (2)
We know that for the agent to minimize its entropy, we need to marginalize over all possible states
(and sequence of actions) that could lead to a given observation. This can be achieved by using the above
factorization:
P (o) =
∑
s
P (o, s) (3)
This is not a trivial task, since the dimensionality of the hidden state (and sequences of actions) space
can be extremely large. Instead, we utilize a variational approximation of this quantity, P (o), which is
tractable and allows us to estimate quantities of interest.
Definition 3 (Variational free energy). Using Jensen’s inequality, we can define the variational free
energy, F , or the upper bound on surprise. This is, commonly, known as the (negative) evidence lower
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bound (ELBO) in variational inference literature (Blei, Kucukelbir et al., 2017):
− logP (o) = − log
∑
s
P (o, s) (4)
≤ −
∑
s
Q(s) log
P (o, s)
Q(s)
(5)
=
∑
s
Q(s) log
Q(s)
P (o, s)
(6)
To make the link more concrete, we further manipulate the variational free energy quantity, F :
F =
∑
s
Q(s) log
Q(s)
P (o, s)
(7)
=
∑
s
Q(s) log
Q(s)
P (s|o)P (o) (8)
=
∑
s
Q(s)
(
log
Q(s)
P (s|o) − logP (o)
)
(9)
= DKL[Q(s)||P (s|o)]− logP (o) (10)
By rearranging the last Equation, the connection between surprise and variational free energy is made
explicit:
− logP (o) = F −DKL[Q(s)||P (s|o)] (11)
Additionally, we can express variational free energy as a function of these posterior beliefs in many
forms:
F = DKL[Q(s|pi)||P (s|o, pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
evidence bound
− logP (o)︸ ︷︷ ︸
log evidence
(12)
= DKL[Q(s|pi)||P (s|pi)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
complexity
−Es∼Q(s)[logP (o|s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
accuracy
] (13)
Since KL divergences cannot be less than zero, from Equation 12 we can see that the free energy is
minimized when the approximate posterior becomes the true posterior. In that instance, the free energy
would simply be the negative log evidence for the generative model (Beal, 2003). This highlights that
minimizing free energy is equivalent to maximizing (generative) model evidence. In other words, it is
minimizing the complexity of accurate explanations for observed outcomes, as seen in Equation 13. Note
that we have conditioned the probabilities in Equation 12 and 13 on policies, pi. These policies can be
regarded as particular priors that − as we will see below − pertain to probabilistic transitions among
hidden states. For the moment, the introduction of priors, simply means that the variational free energy
above can be evaluated for any given policy or model of state transitions.
Thinking in terms of variational free energy; enables us to perceive sensory data but does not account
for actions that the agent can take. Therefore, we would like to minimize not only our instantaneous
variational free energy, F , but also our variational free energy in the future; called the expected free
energy, G. Minimization of expected free energy allows the agent to influence the future by taking
actions, which are selected from policies.
Definition 4 (Policy). is defined as a sequence of actions, uτ at time τ , that enable an agent to transition
between hidden states. The total number of policies that can be pursued is defined by some arbitrary
number, K. Formally this can be written:
uτ = pi(τ) where pi ∈ {0, ...,K} (14)
This enables the agent to infer how it must act in the world− as determined by the policies selected−
and how these actions determine subsequent outcomes. This is analogous to model-based reinforcement
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learning using planning (Sutton, 1990): hypothetical roll-outs are used to model the consequences of
each policy. However, active inference goes one step further, deriving its actual policy from these roll-
outs, and therefore can be seen to be implementing a form of imagination-augmentation (Racanie`re,
Reichert, et al., 2017). Policies, a priori, minimize the free energy of beliefs about the future, G (Friston,
FitzGerald et al., 2017). This can be realized by associating the prior probability of any policy with a
softmax function (i.e., normalized exponential) of expected free energy:
P (pi) = σ[−G(pi)] (15)
where σ denotes a softmax function.
We can extend the variational free energy definition to be dependent on time (τ) and policy (pi) (and
present its matrix formulation: Equation 18):
F (τ, pi) =
∑
spiτ
Q(sτ|pi) log Q(sτ|pi)
P (oτ, sτ|sτ−1, pi) (16)
= EQ(sτ|pi)
[
DKL[Q(sτ|pi)||P (sτ|sτ−1, pi)]
]− EQ(sτ|pi) [ lnP (oτ|sτ)] (17)
= spiτ
(
log spiτ − logBpiτ−1spiτ−1 − logAoτ
)
(18)
Here spiτ is the expected state conditioned on each policy; B
pi
τ is the transition probability for hidden
states under each action prescribed by a policy at a particular time; A is the expected likelihood matrix
mapping from hidden states to outcomes and oτ represents the outcomes.
Definition 5 (Expected free energy). is the variational free energy of future trajectories. It effectively
evaluates evidence for plausible policies based on outcomes that have yet to be observed (Parr & Fris-
ton, 2018). It can be derived from Equation 16 by taking an expectation under the posterior predictive
distribution given by P (oτ|sτ). This captures the idea of predicting future outcomes, given future hidden
states, conditioned on policies.
G(pi) =
∑
τ
G(τ, pi) (19)
The expected free energy can be decomposed in complementary ways (and it’s matrix formulation: Equa-
tion 26):
G(τ, pi) =
∑
sτ,oτ
P (oτ|sτ)Q(sτ|pi) log Q(sτ|pi)
P (oτ, sτ|sτ−1, pi) (20)
= EQ˜ [log(Q(sτ|pi)− log(P (oτ, sτ|sτ−1, pi))] (21)
= EQ˜ [log(Q(sτ|pi)− log(P (sτ|oτ, sτ−1, pi))− log(P (oτ))] (22)
≈ EQ˜ [log(Q(sτ|pi)− log(Q(sτ|oτ, sτ−1, pi))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
-ve mutual information
−EQ˜ [log(P (oτ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected log evidence
(23)
= EQ˜ [log(Q(oτ|pi)− log(Q(oτ|sτ, sτ−1, pi))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
-ve epistemic value
−EQ˜ [log(P (oτ))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
extrinsic value
(24)
= DKL[Q(oτ|pi)||P (oτ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected cost
+EQ(sτ|sτ−1,pi) [H[P (oτ|sτ)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected ambiguity
(25)
= opiτ(o
pi
τ −Cτ) + spiτH (26)
where the following assumptions are made: Q˜ = P (oτ|sτ)Q(sτ|pi); Q(oτ|sτ, pi) = P (oτ|sτ);
Cτ = logP (oτ) is the logarithm of prior preference over outcomes andH = −diag
(
EQ[Ai,j ].EQ[A]
)
is the vector encoding the ambiguity over outcomes for each hidden state.
When minimizing expected free energy, we can regard Equation 24 as capturing the imperative to
maximize the amount of information gained − by observing the environment − about the hidden state
(i.e., maximizing epistemic value), whilst maximizing expected value as scored by log preferences (i.e.,
extrinsic value).
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This entails a clear trade-off: the former (epistemic) component promotes curious behavior, with ex-
ploration encouraged as the agent seeks out salient states to minimize uncertainty about the environment,
and the latter (pragmatic) component encourages exploitative behavior, through leveraging knowledge
that enables policies to reach preferred outcomes. In other words, the expected free energy formulation
enables active inference to treat exploration and exploitation as two different ways of tackling the same
problem: minimizing uncertainty. The natural curiosity emerging through this formulation, is in contrast
to reinforcement learning, where curiosity must be manufactured, either through random action selection
(Mnih, Silver et al., 2018) or through additional curiosity terms, which are appended to the reward signal
(Pathak, Efros et al., 2017). Information theoretic approaches have also been explored in a reinforcement
learning context but do not leverage the (beliefs about) latent states implied by the generative model; see
(Still, 2012; Mohamed & Rezende, 2015). Consequently, they do not encourage exploration that would
minimize ambiguity.
Equation 25 offers an alternative perspective on the same objective; i.e. an agent wishes to minimize
the ambiguity, whilst minimizing how much outcomes (under a given policy) deviate from prior pref-
erences P (oτ). Thus, ambiguity, is the expectation of the conditional entropy − or uncertainty about
outcomes − under the current policy. Low entropy suggests that outcomes are salient and uniquely in-
formative about hidden states (e.g., visual cues in a well-lit environment − as opposed to the dark). In
addition, the agent would like to pursue policy dependent outcomes that resemble its preferred outcomes.
This is achieved when the KL divergence between predicted and preferred outcomes (i.e. expected cost)
is minimized by a particular policy. Furthermore, prior beliefs about future outcomes equip the agent
with goal-directed behavior (i.e. towards states they expect to occupy and frequent).
The traditional reward function used in reinforcement learning is therefore replaced with prior beliefs
about preferred outcomes in the future (see Equation 24). The agents prior preferences, logP (oτ), are
defined only to within an additive constant and depend on relative differences between rewarding (famil-
iar) and unrewarding (surprising) outcomes. Thus, the agent will aim to follow a policy that enables both
self-evidencing behavior (i.e., surprise minimization) and satisfies prior preferences.
From this free energy formulation, we can optimize expectations about hidden states, policies, and
precision through inference and optimize model parameters (likelihood, transition states) through learn-
ing (via a learning rate: η). This optimization requires finding sufficient statistics of posterior beliefs that
minimize variational free energy (Firston, Parr et al., 2017). Under variational Bayes, this would mean
iterating the appropriate formulations (for inference and learning) until convergence. However, under
the active inference scheme, we calculate the solution by using a gradient descent (with a default step
size, ζ, of 4) on expected free energy, which allows us to optimize both action-selection and inference
simultaneously (in matrix form) − assuming a particular mean-field approximation (Beck, Pouget, et al.,
2012; Parr, Markovic, et al., 2019):
εpiτ = (logA.oτ + logB
pi
τ−1s
pi
τ−1 + logB
pi
τs
pi
τ+1)− log spiτ (27)
εγ = (β − βτ) + (pi − pi0).G (28)
where βτ = β + (pi − pi0).G; β = 1γ encodes posterior beliefs about precision; pi represents the policies
specifying action sequences and pi0 = σ(−γ.G).
This entails converting the discrete updates, defined in Equation 27 and 28, into dynamics for infer-
ence that minimize state and precision prediction errors: εpiτ = −∂sF and εγ = −∂γF . These prediction
errors are free energy gradients. Gradient flows then produce posterior expectations that minimize free
energy to provide Bayesian estimates of hidden variables. This particular optimization scheme means ex-
pectations about hidden variables are updated over several time scales: during each observation or trial,
evidence for each policy is evaluated based upon prior beliefs about future outcomes. This is determined
by updating posterior beliefs about hidden states (i.e., state estimation under each policy, P (s|pi)) on a
fast time scale, while posterior beliefs find new extrema (i.e., as new observations are sampled, P (s|o))
to produce a slower evidence accumulation over observations.
Using this kind of belief updating, we can calculate the posterior beliefs about each policy; namely, a
softmax function based on expected free energy see Equation 15. The softmax function is a generalized
sigmoid for vector input, and can− in a neurobiological setting− be regarded as a firing rate function of
neuronal depolarization (Friston, Rosch et al., 2017). Having optimized posterior beliefs about policies,
they are used to form a Bayesian model average of the next outcome, which is realized through action.
In active inference, the scope and depth of the policy search is exhaustive, in the sense that any policy
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entertained by the agent is encoded explicitly and any hidden state over the sequence of actions entailed
by policy are continuously updated. However, in practice, using Occams window, a policy is no longer
evaluated if its log evidence is (default n = 20) times less likely than the (current) most plausible policy.
This can be treated as an adjustable hyper-parameter. Additionally, at the end of each sequence of obser-
vations, the expected parameters are updated to allow for learning across trials. This is like Monte-Carlo
reinforcement learning, where model parameters are updated at the end of each trial. Lastly, temporal
discounting emerges naturally from the active inference scheme, where the generative model determines
the nature of discounting (based on γ parameter capturing precision), with predictions in the distal future
being less precise, thus discounted (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017).
The discussion above suggests that, from a generic generative model, we can derive Bayesian updates
that clarify how perception, policy selection and actions shape beliefs about hidden states and subsequent
outcomes in a dynamic (non-stationary) environment. This formulation can be extended to capture a
more representative generative process by defining a hierarchical (deep temporal) generative model as
described in (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017; Firston, Parr et al., 2017; Parr & Friston, 2017), continuous
state spaces models (Buckley, Kim, et al., 2017; Parr & Friston, 2019) or mixed models with both discrete
and continuous states as described in (Firston, Parr et al., 2017; Parr & Friston, 2018). In the case of a
continuous formulation, the generative model state-space can be defined in terms of generalized coor-
dinates of motion, which generally have a non-linear mapping to the observed outcomes. Additionally,
future work looks to evaluate how these formulations (agents) may interact with each other to emulate
multi-agent exchanges. In what follows, we provide a simple worked example to show how this sort of
scheme works.
3 Simulations
This section considers inference using simulations of foraging in a T-maze: for simplicity, we have chosen
a simple paradigm (more complex simulations have been explored in the literature; e.g. behavioral
economics trust games (Moutoussis, Trujillo-Barreto, et al., 2014; Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, et al.,
2015), narrative construction and reading (Friston, Rosch et al., 2017), saccadic searches and scene
construction (Mirza, Adams, et al., 2016), Atari games (Cullen, Davey, et al., 2018), etc). We first
describe the simulation set-up and then simulate how a mouse (artificial agent) learns to navigate (i.e.,
explore and then exploit) a maze to get the reward. The simulations involve searching for rewards (e.g.,
cheese) in a T-maze (Friston, Rigoli et al., 2015).
3.1 Set-up
A mouse (agent) starts at the center of the T-maze: it can either move directly to the right or left arms that
contain cheese or to the lower arm that contains cues that indicate (probabilistically) whether the reward
is in the upper right or left arm. The agent can only move twice and upon entering the upper right or left
arms cannot leave. Thus, an optimal behavior is to first go to the lower arm to find the location of the
reward and then retrieve the reward. If the agent follows this path, it receives a reward of +5 nats, if it
goes directly to the correct reward location it receives a reward of +10 nats, but failure to find the correct
reward location results in −10 nats, at the end of the trail. Notice that rewards and losses are specified
in terms of nats or natural units, because we have stipulated reward in terms of the natural logarithms of
some outcome.
For this setup, we define the generative model as follows: four control states that correspond to
visiting the four locations (the center and three arms − we assume each control state takes the agent to
the associated location), eight hidden states (four locations factorized by two contexts) and seven possible
outcomes. The outcomes correspond to the following: being in the center plus the (two) outcomes at each
of the (three) arms that are determined by the context (the cheese being in the right or left arm).
We define the likelihood A as follows: ambiguous clue at the center (first) location and a definitive
cue at the lower (fourth) location (refer to Figure 2). The remaining locations provide a reward with
probability p = 98% based on the context (i.e., reward on the right or left). The action-specific transition
probabilities B encode how an agent may move, except for the second and third locations, which are
absorbing hidden states that the agent cannot leave. We define the agent as having extremely precise
beliefs about the contingencies (i.e. large prior concentration parameters). Additionally, the utility of
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Figure 2: Generative model of a T-maze: The model contains four action states that encode movement
to one of the four locations: center, lower arm, upper right and left arm. These states control the ability
to transition between the hidden states that have a Kronecker tensor product (⊗) form with two factors:
location (one of the four) and context (one of the two). These correspond to the location of the cheese
(reward) and associated clues (blue or green). From each of the eight hidden state an observable outcome
is generated and the first two hidden states generate the same outcome that just tells the agent that it
is at the center. A few selected transitions have been shown, indicating that action navigates the agent
to different locations, where outcomes are sampled. Categorical parameters, that define the generative
model,A (hidden states to outcomes) andB (state transitions) have been explicitly defined. Additionally,
lnP (o) corresponds to prior preference: agent expects to find reward. Lastly, rewards represent the score
that the agent receives based on the trial (policy) trajectory (this is not an explicit part of generative model
but a way of accounting for performance)
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Figure 3: Learning the context in a non-stationary environment: the figure shows the contextual learning
of an agent across the trials and the different policies being pursued based on the changing context. The
x-axis represents the trial and y-axis (context learning) represents the concentration parameter updates
for belief (latent) state context over time; i.e. what reward state do I expect to be in; left or right. The
green and red dots represent the context for the trial: right and left, respectively. The blue, cyan and
purple dots represent the policies that the agent chooses to follow in each trial. Initially, the agent expects
to find the reward in upper left arm (0.60) but this slowly goes down (to approximately 0.20) by the end
of trial 15. In contrast, the agent updates his context state concentration parameters for finding the reward
in the upper left arm (0.40 to 0.80) by the end of the 15th trial. This is reflected in the change in policy
from exploratory right policy: middle, bottom, right− cyan dot to exploitative right policy: middle, right
− purple dot from the 18th trial. However, continuously changing context (denoted by the gray dashed
lines), causes the agent to alternate between exploratory and exploitative policies til trial 160: when it
chooses to be exploitative.
the outcomes, C, is defined by lnP (o) : 10 and −10 for rewarding and unrewarding outcome: this is a
replacement for writing out an explicit reward function. This means, that the agent expects to be rewarded
e20 times more than experiencing a neutral outcome. Having specified the state-space and contingencies,
we can solve the belief updating Equations 27 and 28 to simulate behavior. Prior beliefs about the initial
state were initialized with concentration parameters of a Dirichlet distribution (d = 8) for the central
location for each context and zero otherwise. This can be regarded as the number of times (pseudo-
count) each state, transition or policy has previously been encountered. Additionally, we remove policies
with a relative posterior probability of 1/128 or less then that fall outside Occams window. Pseudo-
code for the belief updating and action selection for this particular type of discrete state-space and time
formulation is presented in Appendix 5.2.
3.2 Learning to navigate the maze
To highlight how the (agent) mouse learnt where the reward was located, in a non-stationary environment,
we simulated 200 trials. The first three trials alternated between the two contexts: reward on either right
or left. Then the context indicated by the clue in the lower arm was specified as being right until trial 24,
left from trial 24 to 32, right again from trial 32 to 48 and left again from trial 48 to 64. After trial 64, it
remained right till the end of the simulation. These context changes allowed us to evaluate how quickly
the mouse was able to switch between epistemic and exploitative policies and identify the correct reward
location.
For the first 15 trials, the agent selected epistemic policiesfirst going to the lower arm and then pro-
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ceeding to the reward location (i.e., left or right). This suggests that the agent was not entirely confident
about what context might be in play. This is highlighted in Figure 3 (showing updates to the initial state
concentration parameters reflective of context learning in different contexts). Initially the agent is un-
certain which context it might be in since both contexts have similar probabilities. However, post-trial
3 there is a shift in the updates attuning to a consistent context (right) till trial 24. During this time, the
agent becomes increasingly confident about the context and starts to directly visit the reward location
(from trial 18). This is highlighted via the switch in policy being pursued from exploratory right policy:
middle, bottom, right − cyan dot to exploitative right policy: middle, left − purple dot (see Figure 3).
However, whilst pursing an exploitative policy, the context switches from right to left at trial 24 (see
black arrow in Figure 4) and the agent, chooses the wrong upper arm twice (and receives negative re-
ward). This causes the agent to (once again) pursue an exploratory policy of first going to the bottom −
to collect the clue − and then deciding which arm to go to next. After this, the agent continues to purse
exploratory policies, due to the changing context after every 10 trails. However, after trial 64, the agent
is consistently exposed to the same context. This enables it to accumulate enough evidence and it can
once again switch the policy being pursued from exploratory right policy: middle, bottom, right − cyan
dot to exploitative right policy: middle, left − purple dot.
This paradigm and its extensions − as explored in earlier work (Friston, FitzGerald et al., 2017),
e.g. inability to move to lower / upper arms or wrong cues − cause the mouse to pragmatically change
its behavior (and continue to explore the environment) with slower convergence towards the optimal
policy (+10 reward; directly going to the correct reward location) when uncertain. This highlights that
active inference agents are equipped with a natural trade-off between exploration (to better understand
the environment) and exploitation (choosing pragmatic policies). In other words, the mouse will continue
to explore until it is confident about the environment. However, despite being reasonably confident about
a given environment, the agent can rapidly adapt to changing contexts and new observations, as seen in
the simulations above.
In short, active inference offers an attractive, natural adaptation mechanism for training artificial
agents due to its Bayesian model updating properties. This is contrast to reinforcement learning where
issues of non-stationarity in environments are dealt with using techniques that involve the inclusion of
inductive biases; e.g. importance sampling of experiences in multi-agent environments (Foerster, Chen,
et al., 2017) or using meta-learning to adapt gradient-update approaches more quickly (Al-Shedivat,
Bansal, et al., 2018).
4 Discussion
We have described active inference − and the underlying minimization of variational and expected free
energy − using a (simplified) discrete state-space and time formulation. Throughout this review, we
have suggested that active inference can be used as framework to understand how agents (biological or
artificial) operate in dynamic, non-stationary environments (Friston, Rosch et al., 2017), via a standard
gradient descent on a free energy functional. In a more general (non-equilibrium physics) setting, active
inference can be thought of as a formal way of describing the behavior of random dynamical systems
(that possess a Markov blanket between internal states and observations).
As noted in the formulation of active inference (see Equation 24), epistemic foraging (or exploration)
emerges naturally. This is captured by the desire to maximize the mutual information between obser-
vations and the hidden state on the environment. Exploration means that the agent seeks out states that
afford observations, which minimize uncertainty about (hidden) states of affairs. Note that in the formu-
lation presented, we did not discuss parameter exploration that might also be carried out by the agent (by
applying the expected free energy derivations to likelihood parameters in A)(Schwartenbeck, Passecker
et al., 2019). The T-maze simulation highlighted this natural transition from exploratory (epistemic)
policies to exploitative (pragmatic) policies that underpin active inference. Initially, when the agent was
uncertain about hidden state (i.e. context), it engaged in exploratory behavior. This behavior manifested
by choosing policies where it would first go to the lower arm to disclose the cue that allowed it to deter-
mine the location of the reward. Behavior did not change quantitatively, until it was sufficiently confident
about the context in play via the updating of the concentration parameters; i.e., learning.
Active inference gives us a natural way to account for uncertainty via the minimization of the ex-
pected free energy (Parr & Friston, 2017). It accounts for uncertainty regarding the parameters of the
10
Figure 4: Accumulated reward across trial: the figure above shows how reward is accumulated across
the trials. Initially, we see the agent choosing to go to the lower arm (to collect the clue) and then go
to either the left or right. This type of exploratory policy is crucial at the beginning since the reward
location randomly fluctuates between left and right. From trial 3 to 23, the reward location is consistent.
The agent learns to exploit this post-trial 18, when it starts going directly to the reward location (right)
and collecting the cheese (+10). However, when the context changes at trial 24: the agent chooses the
wrong arm twice and receives negative (−10) reward as highlighted by the black arrow. After this, the
accumulated reward continues to increase at a steady rate (+5). This changes to +10 from trial 160.
Interestingly, if the agent had been following the optimal policy (middle, reward location) from the start
it would collect the same accumulated reward (1200) at trial 120 (dotted gray line), instead of trial 200.
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generative model such as the mapping from hidden states of the world to observations, temporal evolu-
tion of world (via state transitions) and even the initial starting point of the environment − by defining
appropriate Dirichlet distributions over these quantities. Additionally, we can parameterize uncertainty
about potential policies based on (precision) introduced above. In the T-maze simulation, resolving un-
certainty about the state of the world was the main objective of the mouse and by accumulating evidence,
it was able to make correct inferences in later trials.
Our treatment has emphasized that, via a belief-based scheme, active inference enables us to specify
reward functions in terms of prior beliefs − or not specify rewards at all (to produce purely epistemic
behavior). However, if rewards are available as observations or actions, they can be assigned high prior
preferences. An agent is likely to maximize reward (or extrinsic value) by having prior preferences about
unsurprising outcomes (see Equation 23 via the minimization of expected free energy. It is important
to note that the minimization of expected free energy is achieved by choosing appropriate policies (se-
quences of actions). We accounted for this in the T-maze simulation where the mouse had strong positive
preference for finding the cheese in either right or left upper arm, depending on the context. Additionally,
ending up in locations without the reward was associated with strong negative preferences.
Finally, as has been demonstrated, agents using active inference demonstrate many canonical proper-
ties with respect to learning and decision making; such as natural exploration and exploitation trade-off,
the capacity to account for and make decisions given uncertainty, and adaptive approaches in the face of
non-stationarity. Classical reinforcement learning requires additional engineering of such mechanisms
into its formulation, whereas with active inference, such properties emerge naturally by minimising free
energy.
However, it is worth noting that these properties follow from the form of the underlying generative
model. The challenge is to identify the correct generative model that best explains the generative process
(or the empirical responses) of interest (Gershman & Beck, 2017). This can be framed through more
complex forms (via amortization) or learnt through structural learning (Gershman & Niv, 2010; Tervo,
Tenenbaum, et al., 2016). Thus, if one was to find the correct generative model, active inference could be
used for a variety of different problems; e.g. robotic arm movement, dyadic agents, playing Atari games,
etc. We note that the task of defining the appropriate generative model (discrete or continuous) might
be difficult. Thus, future work should look to incorporate implicit generative models (based on feature
representation from empirical data) or shrinking hidden state-space by defining transition probabilities
based on likelihood (rather than latent states).
Software note
The routines described in this paper are available as MATLAB code in the SPM academic software:
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/. The simulations reported in the figures can be reproduced (and cus-
tomised) via a graphical user interface by typing (in the MATLAB command window) DEM and selecting
appropriate demonstration routine (DEM demo MDP X.m).
The accompanying MATLAB script is called spm MDP VB X.m.
Acknowledgments
NS is funded by the Medical Research Council (Ref: 2088828). KJF is funded by the Wellcome Trust
(Ref: 088130/Z/09/Z).
Disclosure statement
The authors have no disclosures or conflict of interest.
12
5 Appendix
5.1 Explicit parameterisation of the generative model
Active inference rests on the tuple (O,S, T,R, P,Q) :
• A finite set of outcomes, O
• A finite set of control states or actions, U
• A finite set of hidden states, S
• A finite set of time-sensitive policies, T
• A generative process R(o˜, s˜, u˜) that generates probabilistic outcomes o ∈ O from (hidden) states
s ∈ S and action u ∈ U
• A generative model P (o˜, s˜, pi, z) with parameters z, over outcomes, states, and policies pi ∈ T ,
where pi ∈ 0, ...,K returns a sequence of actions uτ = pi(τ)
• An approximate posterior Q(s˜, pi, z) = Q(so|pi)..Q(sτ|pi)Q(pi)Q(z) over states, policies and pa-
rameters with expectations (spi0 , ..., s
pi
τ , pi, z)
The generative process describes transitions between hidden (unobserved) states in the world that
generate (observed) outcomes. Their transitions depend on action, which depends on posterior beliefs
about the next state. Subsequently, these beliefs are formed using a generative model of how observations
are generated. The generative model (based on partially observable MDP) describes what the agent
believes about the world, where beliefs about hidden states and policies are encoded by expectations.
Here actions are part of the generative process in the world and policies are part of the generative model
of the agent.
5.2 Pseudo-code for belief updating and action selection
Initialize the following:
Probability of seeing observations, given states, likelihood: A
Probability of transitioning between states, given an action: B
Log probability of agent’s preferences about outcomes: C
Probability of state the agent believes it is at the beginning of each trial: D
for τ = 1 : T do
Sample state, s based on generative process
Sample outcome o based on likelihood matrix A
Variational updates of expected states, s under sequential policies
(gradient descent on F )
Evaluate expected free energy G of policies pi
Bayesian model averaging of expected states s over policies pi
Select action with the lowest expected free energy
end
Accumulation of (concentration) parameters for learning update based on learning rate
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